We examine two hypotheses to explain stock mispricing: (a) the money illusion hypothesis (Modigliani and Cohn (1979) ) and (b) the resale option hypothesis (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) ). We find that the money illusion hypothesis may explain the level, but not the volatility of mispricing in the US market. By contrast, the stock resale option hypothesis, which stems from heterogeneous beliefs about future dividend growth rates and short-sales constraints, can explain both the level and the volatility of mispricing. The evidence suggests that while the two hypotheses complement each other in explaining the level of mispricing, the resale option hypothesis provides a more coherent explanation for asset price bubbles, in which extraordinarily high price levels are often accompanied by excessive volatility and frenzied trading.
I. Introduction
To what extent stock prices reflect their fundamental value is a question that has challenged investors as well as academics for decades. Fama (1970) proposes the efficient market hypothesis, in which prices fully reflect available information. Later, Shiller (1981) finds evidence that stock price volatility appears to be far too high to be attributed to new information about future dividends. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) find evidence that the stock market as a whole tends to overreact to dramatic news events, leading them to propose the overreaction hypothesis, as an alternative to the efficient market hypothesis.
Summarizing his view on this issue, Campbell (2000 Campbell ( , p. 1557 Campbell ( -1558 wrote "It is unrealistic to hope for a fully rational, risk-based explanation of all the empirical patterns…A more reasonable view is that rational models of risk and return describe a long-run equilibrium toward which financial markets gradually evolve." In this context, the long-run value of a stock may be considered its fundamental value component, while the part of the stock price that deviates from the long-run value is its mispricing component.
In this paper, we ask what might explain stock market mispricing. In the valuation framework of discounted dividend models (e.g., Campbell and Shiller (1988) ), fundamental value is determined by objective expectations of future dividend growth rates and future discount rates, given observed data. Under the rational expectations paradigm, all investors' subjective probability measures are assumed to coincide with corresponding objective measures and hence, by construction, there is no mispricing. In this study, we relax this assumption and consider the possibility that investors are not fully rational. Under the limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ), stock mispricing can arise to reflect such irrational beliefs.
We formalize investor irrationality into two alternative hypotheses-money illusion and resale option-to explain stock mispricing. Modigliani and Cohn (1979) propose the money illusion hypothesis; that is, investors suffer from money illusion by discounting real dividends at nominal interest rates. This error leads to an inflation-induced mispricing such that stock prices are above (below) the stock's underlying fundamental value when expected inflation is low (high). Following Harrison and Kreps (1978) , Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) propose the resale option hypothesis, which states that differences of opinion about future dividend growth rates, together with short-sales constraints, create a situation where stock prices are higher than even the most optimistic investor's assessment of their fundamental value. This causes a bubble in stock prices. Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2005) show that this hypothesis can explain Chinese A-B share premia.
We test the resale option hypothesis for the US stock market with a more general framework based on Campbell and Shiller's (1988) dynamic valuation model. In this framework, we separate the fundamental value component from the mispricing component and examine to what extent the mispricing component can be explained by the resale option hypothesis.
According to Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) , the resale option hypothesis predicts that both the level and the volatility of mispricing are positively related to heterogeneous beliefs, as manifested in share turnover. Along with share turnover, we use the implied volatility differential (IVD) between out-of-the-money and at-the-money S&P 500 put options as a proxy for heterogeneous beliefs in our empirical analysis. To our knowledge, we are the first to employ the Campbell-Shiller framework to test the resale option hypothesis for the US stock market.
We employ S&P 500 index data both for the quarterly sample ) and the monthly sample to conduct our empirical analysis. Our results show that the level of mispricing is positively related to both share turnover and IVD, and negatively related to inflation expectations. These results suggest that the two hypotheses complement each other in explaining the level of mispricing. However, our results also show that while mispricing volatility is positively related to share turnover and IVD, it is not related to inflation expectations. Thus, the differential influence on mispricing volatility suggests that the resale option hypothesis may provide a more coherent explanation for asset price bubbles, in which extraordinary price levels are often accompanied by excess volatility and frenzied trading. This paper proceeds as follows. Section II introduces two hypotheses to explain stock mispricing. Section III discusses the methodologies employed in our empirical analysis. Section IV describes the data and proxies for heterogeneous beliefs. Section V presents the main empirical results. Section VI reports a variety of robustness tests. Section VII concludes.
II. Explaining Stock Mispricing
We follow the approach of Brunnermeier and Julliard (2007) to define mispricing. That is, we adopt Campbell and Shiller's (1988) dynamic valuation model (ignoring a constant term) for the price-dividend ratio, but allow investors to have subjective (possibly distorted) probability measures. The mispricing term, denoted by t ε , is defined as the difference between the realized price-dividend ratio, denoted by t t p d − , given investors' subjective probability measures, and the estimated price-dividend ratio (i.e., the "fundamental value" component),
− , based on objective probability measures consistent with available information, i.e., 
for the period; denotes log dividend growth rate; r denotes log stock return; denotes less the log risk-free rate for the period; denotes r less the log risk-free rate. To distinguish differences in expectations, we use E as the objective expectation operator, and as the subjective expectation operator. Below we consider two hypotheses to explain the mispricing measure, Modigliani and Cohn (1979) propose the money illusion hypothesis, which holds that investors discount real dividends by nominal discount rates, but fail to recognize that an increase in expected inflation also leads to an increase in the nominal dividend growth rate. Denoted by t π , inflation at time t, investors' subjective expectations under the money illusion hypothesis may be written as (Ritter and Warr (2002) , Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) , Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005) , and Chordia and Shivakumar (2005) ).
A. Money Illusion Hypothesis
(2) ( ) ( ) , f
B. Resale Option Hypothesis
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) propose the resale option hypothesis to explain stock mispricing or speculative bubbles. They argue that investors have heterogeneous, subjective probability measures for dividend growth rates. Such subjective beliefs may stem from investor overconfidence in their own private signals (Kyle and Wang (1997) , Wang (1998) , and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) ). To capture such differences in opinion, it is sufficient to consider two heterogeneous groups of investors, A and B, such that each group's subjective expectations of dividend growth rates may be written as 
where A t f and B t f represent the subjective components of the dividend growth rates for groups A and B, respectively. Furthermore, consider that these investors are also subject to short-sales constraints (Miller (1977) and Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) ). Such short-sales constraints imply that only the opinion of the owner group is prominently reflected in the market. This means that the identity of the owner group may switch between the two groups, A and B, depending on which group is relatively more optimistic. Hence, the subjective expectations of the dividend growth rate for the owner group, denoted by o t E , may be written as 1 It appears that money illusion causes only a negative mispricing error, t ε , in (3). But this is not true if investors have a reference level of inflation as noted in Brunnermeier and Julliard (2007) . In that case, the relevant inflation term in (3) is the deviation of inflation expectations from the reference level, and hence the mispricing error can be either positive or negative. In our analysis, we do use a demeaned measure for inflation expectations. 
Equation (6) , or "excess optimism" about future dividend growth rates. Both Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) show that such excess optimism causes greater share turnover and gives rise to a "resale option" value, which reflects an upward bias that the owner group is willing to pay above their fundamental value.
Furthermore, they also show that such excess optimism leads to greater mispricing volatility or "excess" volatility, denoted by ε σ . Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2005) extend the work of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) into a general equilibrium model of sentiment and show that such "excess optimism" can indeed lead to excess volatility in stock prices. The resale option hypothesis thus yields two related testable implications that both the level of mispricing ( t ε ) and the volatility of mispricing ( ε σ )
increase with the degree of heterogeneous beliefs among investors, which are manifested by share turnover. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to test both these predictions of the resale option hypothesis for the US stock market.
III. Empirical Methodology
In this section, we describe the basic VAR model that is used to decompose the realized log price-dividend ratio, t t p d − , into the estimated log price-dividend ratio (i.e., the fundamental value component), t t p d − , and the mispricing component, t ε . We then discuss our regression models used to test the two hypotheses.
A. First Pass Analysis: the VAR Model
Following previous studies Shiller (1988), Campbell (1991) , and 
where the discounted expected excess log dividend growth rates, 
B. Second Pass Regression Analysis
The money illusion hypothesis suggests that the level of mispricing (ε ) is negatively related to expected inflation. Following Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) , we use the smoothed moving average of inflation (π ) to measure expected inflation. The resale option hypothesis suggests that both the level of mispricing (ε ) and the volatility of mispricing ( ε σ ) are positively related to the degree of heterogeneous beliefs among investors. We use two proxies for the level of heterogeneous beliefs among investors: (a) share turnover, Turnover, and (b) implied volatility differential, IVD (i.e., the SPX put volatility smirk). The rationales and measurements for these two proxies are detailed in Section IV below.
Specifically, we compare the two hypotheses in explaining the level of mispricing based on the following regression model
Turnover IVD e t t ε α β β β π
The resale option hypothesis implies that the coefficients of the heterogeneous beliefs measures are positive; that is, 0 ( 1, 2)
By contrast, the money illusion hypothesis implies that the coefficient of the inflation measure is negative; that is, 3 0 β < . The two hypotheses need not be mutually exclusive in explaining the level of mispricing.
Likewise, we compare the two hypotheses in explaining the volatility of mispricing based on the following regression model
Turnover IVD
The mispricing volatility, and Schneider (2007)). As such, by including the inflation variable along with turnover and IVD in the regression, we may partially control for this alternative source of heterogeneous beliefs.
High price levels, excess volatility, and concurrent frenzied trading are the most salient characteristics of historical episodes of asset price bubbles. By testing the two hypotheses for both the level and the volatility of mispricing, we may gauge their usefulness as a unified framework to explain the asset price bubble phenomenon. 
IV. Data

A. Share Turnover
We use share turnover as our first proxy for heterogeneous beliefs, following Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) , who suggest that greater heterogeneous beliefs lead to more frequent trading and thereby a higher turnover rate. In addition, this measure is consistent with previous models of overconfidence (Shefrin and Statman (1994) , Kyle and Wang (1997), Wang (1998) , and Odean (1998)) and differences of opinion (Harris and Raviv (1993) ).
Specifically, we employ a value-weighted approach to estimate the quarterly S&P 500
Index turnover ratio using all component stocks in the index (10) 500 , 500 1 , , 1 n t n t t n n t n t n Volume MV Turnover Ratio Shares
where Volume n,t is the trading volume, Shares n,t is the total shares outstanding, and MV n,t is the market value for stock n at time t. Similar to the procedure used by Campbell and Voulteenaho (2004) to construct the smoothed inflation measure, the turnover ratio is exponentially smoothed using 12 monthly lags. The smoothed measure is further detrended to eliminate any additional trend influence to arrive at the new turnover ratio, denoted Turnover.
B. Implied Volatility Differential (IVD)
We use the Implied Volatility Differential (IVD) between out-of-the-money (OTM) and at-the-money (ATM) SPX put options (i.e., the S&P put volatility smirk) 5 as our second proxy for heterogeneous beliefs among investors. Similar proxies based on the options literature are 4 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange started recording tick-by-tick trading in S&P 500 Futures Index options in 1987. However, because of a change of record format in 1990, we employ data beginning in 1990 to ensure data consistency. 5 The volatility smirk in index options markets refers to the phenomenon that implied volatilities are negatively related to option exercise prices. The literature has shown that, for SPX index options, OTM put options have greater implied volatility than ATM put options. used in previous studies (e.g., De Bondt (1993), Shefrin (1999) , Bollen and Whaley (2004) , and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) ). The literature suggests that the SPX put volatility smirk is an effective proxy for heterogeneous beliefs between investors.
Specifically, we first calculate the difference between the implied volatility of the OTM SPX put, denoted , and the implied volatility of the ATM SPX put, denoted
however that the implied volatility of each options contract may co-move with overall market volatility. To mitigate this effect, we scale the difference using the Chicago Board Options
Exchange volatility index, VIX, and the resulting scaled measure, IVD, is given by
Implied volatility is estimated based on Black (1976 
We also classify options into different maturities (1 month, 2 months, and 3 months). Test results using these differing maturities are qualitatively similar.
7 Despite the advantage of the put volatility smirk in capturing heterogeneous beliefs, we construct a new IVD to incorporate the remote possibility that index calls may also play a role in the measurement of heterogeneous beliefs. Specifically, we define a new IVD as the sum of the volatility smirk of the index puts and the index calls, again scaled by VIX. Our empirical results are qualitatively similar, albeit slightly weaker, perhaps due to the dilution effect of index calls as bulls can always bet in the underlying stock markets, thus diluting the call's ability to capture heterogeneous beliefs.
8 Based on Bayesian information criteria and consistent with Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) , we employ one lag in the VAR model. A three-lag VAR is also investigated and reported in Section V. significant at the 5% level. The model explains almost 97% of the variations in log pricedividend ratio. The second row shows that past excess log dividend growth Granger causes excess log dividend growth. The model explains 42% of the variations in excess log dividend growth. The third row shows regression results of the excess log return equation. The low R 2 value is consistent with the notion that stock returns are hard to predict. Lagged log pricedividend ratio,
, is the only variable that is statistically significant (at the 5% level).
Finally, the fourth row reports results for the inflation equation. Lagged stock return and inflation
Granger causes inflation. The model explains almost 91% of the variations in inflation.
p d −
Once the VAR model is estimated, we decompose the realized log price-dividend ratio into the estimated log price-dividend ratio (i.e., the fundamental value component), and the mispricing component. The demeaned decomposition result based on the quarterly S&P 500 index sample from 1962 to 2004 is plotted in Figure 1 . Relative to fundamental value, the stock market was fairly priced before the 1974 oil embargo, undervalued during the double-digit inflation era, fairly priced again from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, but increasingly overvalued after 1996, until the market crashed at its peak around March 2000. After the crash and until 2004, the market remained overvalued, albeit with a decreasing magnitude. Figure 1 also indicates that substantial variation in the price-dividend ratio is driven by variation in the mispricing component, whereas the fundamental value component is comparatively smooth.
B. Unit Root Test and Shifting Steady-State
Although Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) Adopting the Lettau and Nieuwerburgh (2007) approach, we first test for the shift of steady-state using the methodology of Bai and Perron (1998 , which allows for testing unknown structural breaks for time series. Test results are reported in Table 2 . Because only mispricing and share turnover exhibit nonstationarity, they are subject to the structural break test and must be adjusted for shifting steady-state. UDmax tests the null hypothesis of no structural breaks against the alternative hypothesis of an unknown number of structural breaks (with an upper bound of five breaks). Because UDmax is statistically significant at the 1% level, the null hypothesis of no structural breaks is rejected. With the number of steady-states determined, we follow Lettau and Nieuwerburgh (2007) to subtract the respective steady-state means from the row data of each series for further analysis.
To ensure that the demeaned series are now stationary, we rerun the unit root test for these steady-state adjusted data. After the adjustment, all variables are now stationary. For example, the ADF test statistics of mispricing and turnover in the longer sample are now -9.08 and -7.29, respectively, both of which are well below the critical value of -3.47 at the 1% level.
C. Mispricing, Inflation, and Heterogeneous Beliefs
In this subsection, we show the effects of inflation and heterogeneous beliefs on the level of mispricing. Before presenting the regression results, it is useful to visualize the relation between the dependent variable (mispricing) and two independent variables (turnover and inflation). To this end, Figure The multivariate regression results reported in row 4 are very similar to the univariate results, in which turnover and IVD continue to be highly significant, and the inflation effect continues to be weak. Note from the adjusted R 2 value that IVD is the most influential explanatory variable in the shorter sample-alone, it explains 13% of the variation in mispricing. These results lend support to the resale option hypothesis in explaining stock mispricing. Although the inflation hypothesis works well in the longer sample, it fails to explain the mispricing in the more recent
Internet bubble period.
D. Mispricing Volatility, Inflation, and Heterogeneous Beliefs
In this subsection, we examine the effects of inflation and heterogeneous beliefs on the volatility of mispricing. Before presenting the regression results, again, it is useful to visualize the relation between the dependent variable (mispricing volatility) and two independent variables (turnover and inflation). To this end, Figure 3 plots the quarterly time-series data of mispricing volatility, turnover, and inflation, respectively. The figure shows that mispricing volatility was actually quite stable from 1962 to the early 1970s. After the 1974 oil embargo, mispricing volatility increased significantly and continued into the double-digit inflation era. Mispricing volatility was mild again from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. Since late 1996, mispricing volatility has increased drastically and coincided with the Internet bubble trading frenzy.
Volatility peaked around 2000 when the bubble burst. Inflation tracked mispricing volatility well during the periods of double-digit inflation, but failed to display a coherent relationship during other periods. Turnover generally moves in tandem with mispricing volatility, especially during the more recent decades. Table 4 reports the results of the effects of inflation and heterogeneous beliefs on the volatility of mispricing based on steady-state adjusted data. All t statistics reported are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. Panel A shows test results using the longer sample .
Both univariate and multivariate analyses show that turnover displays a positive and significant relation with mispricing volatility, consistent with the prediction of the resale option hypothesis.
Inflation, however, does not show a significant relation with mispricing volatility. Table 4 Table 4 , therefore, are more consistent with the second prediction of the resale option hypothesis that heterogeneous beliefs on dividend growth can explain mispricing volatility with the predicted sign. By contrast, the money illusion hypothesis does not produce a significant empirical relation in this regard.
To sum up, as in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) , the money illusion hypothesis is able to explain the level of stock mispricing. But the resale option hypothesis is better able to provide a more coherent explanation for both the level and the volatility of stock mispricing.
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VI. Robustness Tests
In this section, we conduct three robustness tests. 
A. Time-Varying Liquidity
Although the turnover measure is employed as a proxy for heterogeneous beliefs in our study, it has also been used in the literature as a proxy for time-varying liquidity. Could the positive relation between turnover and mispricing reported herein be driven by time-varying liquidity instead of heterogeneous beliefs? We address this issue by conducting a robustness test for this alternative interpretation.
To do so, we employ proxies of market-wide time-varying liquidity that are relevant for low-frequency data such as ours. In addition, we are mindful about the distinction between liquidity risk and liquidity characteristics (or level of liquidity) in the literature (see, e.g.,
Hasbrouck (2005)). To this end, we employ two distinct liquidity proxies: (a) Pastor and Stambaugh's (2003) liquidity risk measure, Gamma, a return reversal measure that captures the association between stock return and lagged order flow; and (b) a liquidity characteristic measure, Gibbs, a Bayesian version of Roll's (1984) transaction cost measure that captures the bid-ask bounce that is not related to information (Hasbrouck (2005) ). Both Gamma and Gibbs are adjusted for sample frequency in our tests.
Specifically, we add the two liquidity measures, Gamma and Gibbs, to control for timevarying liquidity in our empirical tests for the long sample , where turnover is the only measure for heterogeneous beliefs. We rerun our test for the level of mispricing as γ , of the inflation measure.
We report the results of regressions (12) and (13) Table 4 , inflation still fails to explain mispricing volatility. In row 3, both measures of liquidity are included in the same regression, and the conclusions are similar to those reported in the first two rows. Interestingly,
Gibbs is significant at the 1% level in both rows 2 and 3. This result is consistent with the finding of Chordia et al. (2000) that volatile stocks post higher inventory risk and hence are less liquid.
In sum, after controlling for time-varying liquidity, the credibility of turnover as a measure of heterogeneous beliefs is upheld and, hence, the marginal contribution of the resale option hypothesis in explaining stock mispricing is strengthened.
B. Choice of Optimal Lags
The results reported so far are based on a VAR model estimated with one lag. The choice of one lag is based on Bayesian information criteria (BIC), which happens to be consistent with the models used in Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) .
However, Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Mei (1993) note that VAR specification often needs several lags to fully capture this dynamic relationship. In this section, we conduct an alternative test, Akaike information criteria (AIC), to determine the optimal lags. Each of BIC and AIC has its own merits, but neither has a clear-cut advantage (Diebold (1998) ), although it is known that BIC will favor a simpler model. Since AIC determines the optimal lag length to be three, we rerun previous tests based on a three-lag VAR model for a robustness test. Table 6 presents the test results. In Panel A, rows 1 and 2 show the results from regressions of mispricing (ε ) on inflation (π ) and turnover, respectively. Consistent with the results of the one-lag VAR model, the results of the three-lag VAR model show that inflation is negatively correlated, and turnover is positively correlated with mispricing. The same conclusion holds in a multivariate analysis, shown in row 3, where both inflation (π ) and turnover are included in the same regression. Comparing Table 6 to Table 3 , we find that the adjusted R 2 for inflation (π ) drops to 4.33% from 10.34%. The adjusted R 2 for multivariate analysis decreases as well. This result confirms Campbell and Vuolteeenaho's (2004) finding that adding more lags to the VAR model produces more noise to the estimates and reduces the explanatory power of inflation expectations. In Panel B we regress the mispricing volatility ( ε σ ) on inflation and turnover. Consistent with the results from the one-lag VAR model, inflation does not explain the variation in the mispricing volatility, whereas turnover carries the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in both univariate and multivariate analyses. Thus, the choice of the optimal number of lags does not alter our conclusion.
C. Results Based on Monthly Data Sample
While our primary results focus on quarterly data in order to maintain comparability with previous studies, e.g., Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) , we now repeat our analysis using monthly data for additional evidence and robustness check. To this end, we obtain the S&P 500 monthly data from CRSP for the period 1926-2004. The VAR model for the monthly data is estimated with 3 lags according to Bayesian information criteria. Since our quarterly data sample covers the period 1962-2004, by extending the monthly sample back to 1926, we essentially perform a back-test to further validate our main findings above.
Before presenting the regression results, it is useful to visualize the relation between mispricing and turnover as well as inflation. To this end, Figure 4 plots monthly mispricing, turnover, and inflation from January 1927 to December 2004. 11 The figure suggests that the money illusion hypothesis, implying a negative relation between inflation and mispricing, works best from the 1940s to the 1980s. Inflation, however, fails to produce a consistent relation with mispricing during the two major historical bubbles, i.e., the late 1920s and the late 1990s. By contrast, the hypothesized positive relation between share turnover and mispricing is most evident during these bubble periods. The figure suggests that money illusion and resale option hypotheses complement each other and, taken together, they provide a more complete story about stock mispricing. Table 7 reports the results of the effects of inflation and heterogeneous beliefs on the level and the volatility of mispricing, respectively, based on steady-state adjusted data. In Panel A, rows 1 and 2 show results from the regressions of mispricing (ε ) on inflation (π ) and turnover, respectively. Similar to the quarterly data sample, the monthly results show that inflation is negatively correlated, and turnover is positively correlated with mispricing, consistent with both the money illusion and the resale option hypotheses. Both variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. The same conclusion holds in a multivariate analysis, shown in row 3, where inflation (π ) and turnover are both included in the same regression. Thus, our previous results using quarterly data are robust in the monthly sample as well. In fact, the quarterly results are strengthened by the confirming evidence in the monthly results since the monthly sample extends data from 1962 all the way back to 1926.
In Table 7 , Panel B, we regress the mispricing volatility ( ε σ ) on inflation and turnover.
Consistent with the quarterly result, inflation cannot explain the variation in mispricing volatility, whereas turnover carries the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level in both the univariate and multivariate analyses. Thus, the monthly results strengthen the quarterly evidence established earlier that the resale option hypothesis provides a more coherent explanation for the asset bubble phenomenon than does the money illusion hypothesis.
VII. Conclusions
We document substantial mispricing in the US stock market from 1926 to 2004 using Campbell and Shiller (1988) as a benchmark valuation model. Furthermore, we examine two hypotheses to explain the mispricing phenomenon: (a) the money illusion hypothesis (Modigliani and Cohn (1979) ), which suggests that stock mispricing is negatively related to expected inflation, and (b) the resale option hypothesis (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) ), which suggests that investors' heterogeneous beliefs about dividend growth rates, together with short-sales constraints, lead to a bubble or mispricing component in stock prices.
We employ S&P 500 index data both for the quarterly sample ) and the monthly sample to conduct our empirical analysis. Two proxies are used for heterogeneous beliefs among investors: (a) the index share turnover and (b) the implied volatility differential (IVD) between out-of-the-money and at-the-money S&P 500 put options. Because some variables are persistent, we test for shifting steady-state and adjust data to obtain stationarity following the procedure of Lettau and Nieuwerburgh (2007) .
Our results show that the level of mispricing is positively related to both share turnover and IVD, and negatively related to expected inflation. While the money illusion hypothesis works well from the 1940s to the 1980s, the resale option hypothesis provides stronger evidence during the two major historical bubble periods, the late 1920s and the late 1990s. The evidence suggests that the two hypotheses complement each other in explaining the level of mispricing.
In addition, our results show that both share turnover and IVD significantly impact mispricing volatility, but expected inflation does not. This differential influence on mispricing volatility suggests that the resale option hypothesis may better explain asset price bubbles in which extraordinarily high price levels are accompanied by excess volatility and frenzied trading. Finally, our empirical results hold well under various robustness checks, including incorporating time-varying liquidity, the choice of the optimal lag in the VAR model, and the use of monthly data in an extended period.
Our finding of a strong resale option effect in stock mispricing underscores the importance of further research in this direction for asset price bubbles. For example, real estate markets are naturally subject to short-sales constraints and heterogeneous beliefs about housing appreciation rates. It would be interesting to investigate whether the resale option effect is typically at work in driving run-ups in housing prices and concurrent trading frenzies during historical episodes of housing bubbles. In addition, by examining the cross-sectional variation of heterogeneous beliefs and short-sale constraints in different industries or sectors, the resale option hypothesis may explain why the technology sector exhibited a price bubble in the late 1990s (Ofek and Richardson (2003) ), whereas other more traditional sectors experienced a lesser degree of mispricing during the same time period. Finally, to the extent that stock mispricing is corrected in the long run, the cross-sectional variation in the mispricing may predict future stock returns. Chen, Lung, and Wang (2007) examine this issue and find evidence that our mispricing measure is distinctly related to the cross-section of stock returns in the future. In particular, stocks with low (high) mispricing outperform (underperform) otherwise similar stocks. 
